

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW  
IMMIGRATION COURT  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Matter of

Date: Sept. 13, 2018

File Number:

Respondent

In Removal Proceedings

Charge: Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, as an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, was not in possession of a valid entry document as required by the Act

Applications: Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and Protection under the Convention Against Torture

On Behalf of Respondent:  
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On Behalf of DHS:  
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DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 13, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") initiated these removal proceedings against Respondent, \_\_\_\_\_, by filing a Notice to Appear ("NTA") with the San Francisco, California, Immigration Court. Exh. 1. The NTA alleges that Respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico, who applied for admission into the United States at the Nogales, Arizona, Port of Entry on July 10, 2017, and did not then possess or present a valid immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid entry document. *Id.* Based on these allegations, DHS charged Respondent with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA" or "Act") § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as amended, as an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, was not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document as required by the Act. *Id.*

On \_\_\_\_\_, Respondent admitted the factual allegations in the NTA and conceded the charge of removability but declined to designate a country of removal. Based on her admissions and concession, the Court sustained the charge of removability and directed

Mexico as the country of removal, should removal become necessary. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c), (f). On 2018, Respondent filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal ("Form I-589"), applying for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). Exh. 3A.

## II. EVIDENCE PRESENTED

The Court has thoroughly reviewed the evidence in the record, even if not explicitly mentioned in this decision. The evidence of record consists of the testimony of Respondent and the following exhibits:

- Exhibit 1: NTA;
- Exhibit 2: Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien;
- Exhibit 3: Letters in support of Respondent's Form I-589;
- Exhibit 3A: Form I-589;
- Exhibit 4: 2016 United States Department of State Human Rights Report for Mexico;
- Exhibit 5: Respondent's documentation in support of her Form I-589;
- Exhibit 6: Respondent's amendments to her Form I-589;
- Exhibit 7: Respondent's supplemental documentation;
- Exhibit 8: Respondent's additional supplemental documentation; and
- Exhibit 9: Respondent's additional supplemental documentation.

### A. Respondent's Testimony and Declaration

Respondent testified before the Court on August 23, 2018, and submitted two declarations in support of her applications for relief. Exhs. 5 at Tab B, 9 at Tab B. The Court summarizes Respondent's testimony and declarations together below.

#### 1. Background.

Respondent was born on \_\_\_\_\_, in \_\_\_\_\_ Mexico. She grew up in Morelos, Mexico with her parents and five siblings. Respondent studied art education and worked as a teacher.

#### 2. Abuse by: \_\_\_\_\_

From the age of 5, until the age of 22, Respondent's mother, \_\_\_\_\_, physically and mentally abused Respondent on a daily basis. Beginning when Respondent was approximately five years old, her mother forced her to complete the duties of a servant, including sweeping, mopping, and washing clothing, to teach Respondent how to be a good housewife. Respondent testified that her mother also beat her to make her strong and to prepare her to be a good wife, teaching her how to tolerate a beating by her future husband. She beat Respondent with a belt, cables from a washing machine, a broomstick, and a kitchen spoon. On one occasion, when Respondent told her father about the abuse, Respondent's mother beat her so severely that she was unable to sit or leave her bed the following day. Respondent also testified that her mother taught her that women always needed to obey their husbands and that

once Respondent was married, Respondent would need to ask him for permission to do anything because he was in charge. She also taught Respondent that the husband is the "superior being who can do no wrong," and if a husband beats his wife, it is her fault.

Respondent also testified that when she was nine or ten years old, she was raped during a robbery of her family's home. She told her mother who committed the robbery but not that she was raped; her mother called her a "liar and blamed [Respondent] for not alerting her to the robbery."

### 3. Abuse by

In 1989, Respondent met her husband, \_\_\_\_\_ ("Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_"). They married in \_\_\_\_\_ Mexico on \_\_\_\_\_, 1993. They have one child, \_\_\_\_\_ ("Ms. R. \_\_\_\_\_"), born on \_\_\_\_\_, 1993.

Approximately three months after they married, Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_ began consistently beating Respondent. On the first occasion, while on a trip to the United States, he slapped her twice across the face and punched her mouth, breaking her two front teeth. When they returned to Mexico, Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_ continued to abuse her, often after consuming alcohol. Respondent testified that Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_ abused her because "he felt wounded in his machismo" and told her "you're not going to step on me. I'm the man and you're going to do what I say." She believes he beat her because she was a woman and believed that she was his equal with a right to her own opinions and ideas.

Respondent also testified that on two occasions, Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_ burned her with cigarettes, leaving permanent scars. During the first incident, in the middle of the night, Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_ burned Respondent's arm with a cigarette while she slept, demanding that she cook for him. She refused, but he insisted that she must cook for him because it was her job. He dragged her by her hair to the kitchen, stating, "A woman's only job was to shut up and obey her husband." Respondent continued to refuse to cook for him, and in response, Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_ slapped her. In the second incident, Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_ burned Respondent's face with a cigarette because she continued to work, despite his orders to quit her job, thus, explicitly disobeying Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_ and continuing to express that she had a right to work. Respondent testified that he burned her to show her that they were not equals, he was in charge, and to impress these principles upon her since he believed she did not understand them.

Eventually, Respondent quit her job. However, Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_ abandoned her approximately six months after they married; Respondent and her daughter lived with Respondent's family. Mr. B \_\_\_\_\_ and Respondent remain married because Respondent's family is Catholic, and her family would disown her if they divorced.

### 4. Abuse by

In January 1995, Respondent entered the United States and began living in Phoenix, Arizona. Approximately two months later, she met \_\_\_\_\_ ("Mr. H \_\_\_\_\_"), and they began a relationship in May 1995. They have three United States citizen



children together,

born 1996,

born 1997, and

born

2004. Shortly after beginning their relationship, Respondent and Mr. H began living together, and Mr. H beat Respondent for the first time because he believed she was having an affair with his friend. However, he did not harm Respondent again until approximately two years later.

Respondent testified that from approximately 1998 until 2016, Mr. H consistently abused her; he also used drugs and abused alcohol often. He beat, raped, and strangled her over the course of their relationship. Mr. H raped her approximately five times per month and beat her approximately three times per month. Respondent testified that she bears physical scars from multiple incidents of his abuse. On one occasion, when Respondent refused to give Mr. H money or sex, he hit her, broke a beer bottle, cut her leg with the bottle, and then raped her. On other occasions when Respondent rejected his sexual advances, Mr. H stated that Respondent was "his woman and had to have sex with him whenever he wanted" before raping Respondent. Mr. H stated that Respondent needed to have sex with him whenever he wanted because she was a woman and thus, "his slave" and required to obey him. On another occasion, in 2004, Respondent entered their home and told Mr. H that his friends should leave. Mr. H warned Respondent that she was not to speak when entering the room and beat Respondent so severely she had a vaginal hemorrhage.

Mr. H often ordered Respondent to quit her job and beat her when he was jealous of her male supervisors. He also demanded she only work with other women and dress as he desired. Respondent testified that when she wore an outfit Mr. H did not approve of, he ripped it off of her. Mr. H also frequently bit Respondent, leaving marks on her neck and arms to show that she was "[his] woman" because others "need[ed] to know it." Respondent also testified that if she resisted due to her belief that they were equal partners, Mr. H harmed her.

Respondent attempted to end her relationship with Mr. H numerous times; however, he refused to leave and would beat and rape her to emphasize his refusal. She believed he mistreated her because she was the mother of his children and he believed he had the power and could do whatever he wanted. In 2015, Respondent moved into a house without Mr. H. Yet, Mr. H found opportunities to physically harm Respondent, often utilizing their children to have contact with her.

In the spring of 2017, Mr. H was removed to his native Guatemala. Shortly thereafter, Respondent was subsequently removed to Mexico, and she returned to her parents' home. She fled Mexico approximately two weeks later because she received menacing phone calls from Mr. H.

## 5. Criminal History

In 2007, Respondent was arrested for criminal impersonation. She testified that when she went to the Department of Motor Vehicles to renew her Arizona identification, the clerk informed her that a social security number was required for the renewal application. When



Respondent expressed that she did not have a social security number, the clerk threatened to call the police; Respondent became fearful and wrote down a random number. She was ultimately convicted and sentenced to one year of probation.

6. Fear of Returning to Mexico

Respondent fears that if she returns to Mexico, she will be persecuted by both Mr. B and Mr. H.

Respondent testified that approximately two years ago, Mr. B called her requesting information regarding her whereabouts. He expressed his desire to rekindle their relationship, but Respondent refused and told him to leave her alone. Thereafter, Respondent changed her phone number. However, Mr. B continued to contact Respondent through Facebook messages, again seeking information on her whereabouts. Respondent deleted her account to prevent Mr. B from contacting her. Yet, Respondent testified that she heard from her daughter that Mr. B visited her and was aggressive; he threatened to take "revenge" against Respondent for rejecting him and having relationships with other men.

Respondent testified that approximately one week after she was removed to Mexico, Mr. H called her on her cell phone and told Respondent he planned to locate her. Respondent believes Mr. H could find her in Mexico because his entire family resides in Chiapas, Mexico. During a second phone call, Mr. H stated that he already confirmed that Respondent was residing at her parents' home in Mexico, and he would be "coming for [Respondent]." Despite Respondent's repeated pleas to Mr. H to leave her alone, he continued to attempt to acquire information about Respondent's whereabouts through their children. She fled to the United States after she continued to feel fear and distress from Mr. H's menacing phone calls. Respondent testified that if Mr. H harmed her in Mexico she would attempt to report him to the police, but she did not believe they would help her. She believed that he would be able to locate her through their children.

B. Documentary Evidence

Respondent submitted a copy of her marriage certificate to the Court. Exh. 9 at 1. Respondent also submitted her psychological evaluation by Dr. Jane Christmas, a licensed clinical psychologist; Dr. Christmas diagnosed Respondent with post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder. *Id.* at 7-24. Respondent also submitted letters of support from community members. *See* Exh. 3.

Respondent submitted declarations from her daughter, Ms. R, and her son, , in which they described the abuse Respondent suffered by both of their fathers. Exh. 5 at 20-25. stated that Mr. H called him after Respondent was removed to Mexico seeking information on her location. *Id.* at 21. Ms. R stated that Mr. B is very aggressive and angry with Respondent because she had a relationship with another man. *Id.* at 23. She also stated that both Mr. B and Mr. H are seeking information on Respondent's whereabouts. *Id.* at 23-24. Respondent also submitted a copy of text messages Mr. H sent to Ms. R seeking information regarding Respondent's location. *Id.*

at 39. The record also includes photographic evidence of the injuries Respondent sustained from the abuse by Mr. H . *Id.* at 29-38.

Respondent submitted a letter from Adriana Prieto-Mendoza, a Mexican attorney; Ms. Prieto-Mendoza stated that Mr. H would be able to obtain permanent residency in Mexico because his children with Respondent are Mexican citizens and included copies of Mexican law to support her statement. Exh. 7 at 30-54.

Finally, Respondent submitted documentation of her criminal convictions. *Id.* at Tab A. The record evinces that in 2007, Respondent was convicted of criminal impersonation and was sentenced to one year of probation, and she was convicted of shoplifting and sentenced to pay a fine. *Id.* at 3-25. In 2017, Respondent was convicted for illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) and sentenced to 150 days of confinement. *Id.* at 27-29.

### C. Country Conditions Evidence

Respondent submitted extensive documentary evidence regarding country conditions in Mexico; *See* Exhs. 5 at Tabs G-OO, 7 Tabs D-M. DHS also submitted country conditions evidence. Exh. 4. The Court has comprehensively reviewed all country conditions evidence in the record and discusses the relevant information in the analysis below.

## III. ANALYSIS

### A. Credibility

A respondent has the burden of proof to establish she is eligible for relief, which she may establish through credible testimony. *See* INA § 240(c)(4). In making a credibility finding under the REAL ID Act, the Court may base its credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant; the inherent plausibility of her account, the consistency between her written and oral statements, the internal consistency of each such statement, the internal consistency of such statements with other evidence of record, any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, or any other relevant factor. *Id.*

The Court analyzed Respondent's testimony for consistency, detail, specificity, and persuasiveness. Overall, Respondent testified in a consistent, believable, and forthright manner, and DHS conceded that Respondent was credible. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Respondent testified credibly and accords her testimony full evidentiary weight. *Id.*

### B. Asylum

To qualify for a grant of asylum, an applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that she meets the statutory definition of a refugee. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i). The Act defines the term "refugee" as any person who is outside her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail herself of the protection of that country because of



past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA § 101(a)(42)(A).

Respondent argues she is eligible for asylum relief based on the past persecution she suffered at the hands of her mother and her husband and based on an independent well-founded fear of harm by her ex-partner.<sup>1</sup> The Court analyzes Respondent's claims for relief below.

#### I. Past Persecution

To establish past persecution, an applicant must show that she experienced harm that (1) rises to the level of persecution, (2) was on account of a protected ground, and (3) was committed by the government or forces the government is unable or unwilling to control. *Navaes v. INS*, 217 F.3d 646, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2000).

##### a. *Harm Rising to the Level Necessary to Establish Persecution*

"Persecution" is "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive." *Sangha v. INS*, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997). Physical violence, such as rape, torture, assault, and beatings, "has consistently been treated as persecution." *Chand v. INS*, 222 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000). In assessing whether an applicant has suffered past persecution, the Court may not consider each individual incident in isolation but must instead evaluate the cumulative effect of the abuse the applicant suffered. *See Krutova v. Gonzales*, 416 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005).

While living in Mexico, Respondent experienced harm by her mother and her husband, Mr. B. See Exhs. 5 at Tab B, 9. The Court addresses the harm Respondent suffered by each in turn.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Respondent was a child at the time of the harm she suffered by her mother, and "age can be a critical factor in the adjudication of asylum claims and may bear heavily on the question of whether an applicant was persecuted . . ." *Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales*, 496 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must assess the alleged persecution from the child's perspective, as the "harm a child fears or has suffered . . . may be relatively less than that of an adult and still qualify as persecution." *Id.* By its common usage, "child abuse" encompasses "any form of cruelty to a child's physical, moral, or mental well-being." *Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez*, 22 I&N Dec. 991, 996 (BIA 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also *Velazquez-Herrera v. Gonzales*, 446 F.3d 781, 782 (9th Cir. 2006). From the age of 5 until the age of 22, Respondent's mother physically harmed Respondent on a daily basis. She beat Respondent with a belt, cables from a washing machine, a broomstick, and a kitchen spoon. On one occasion, Respondent's mother beat her so severely that she was unable to sit or leave her bed the following day. In addition, Respondent's mother forced her to perform all of the duties of a servant at home, which imposed psychological harm upon Respondent. Considered cumulatively, the Court finds that the physical and mental

<sup>1</sup> The Court does not analyze whether the harm Respondent experienced by Mr. B constitutes past persecution because it occurred in the United States and not in the country of prospective return. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A).

abuse of Respondent by her mother constitutes harm rising to the level of persecution. *See Krotova*, 416 F.3d at 1084; *Chand*, 222 F.3d at 1073.

Next, the Court considers the harm Respondent suffered by her husband, Mr. B. Respondent testified that after they married, Mr. B. consistently physically and psychologically abused Respondent during their marriage. He frequently beat her, pulled her hair, slapped her, and on two occasions, burned her with a cigarette, once on her face, leaving permanent scars. He abused her for months before he left her and moved away. The Court finds the harm Respondent suffered by Mr. B. rises to the level of persecution. *See Krotova*, 416 F.3d at 1084; *Chand*, 222 F.3d at 1073.

b. *On Account of a Protected Ground*

In addition to showing harm rising to the level of persecution, an applicant must show that the persecution was on account of one or more of the protected grounds enumerated in the Act: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).

Respondent asserts that she was persecuted on account of her membership in numerous particular social groups,<sup>2</sup> including “women in Mexico.” The Court understands Respondent’s proposed social group to constitute the particular social group “Mexican females.” Accordingly, the Court adopts this refined formulation of the particular social group and addresses each of the three requirements to determine the group’s cognizability under the INA below. Respondent also asserts that she was harmed on account of her political opinions, including: (1) that women have the right to pursue a career; (2) men and women have equal rights; and (3) husbands and wives have equal status. The Court understands each of these three political opinions to constitute a feminist political opinion and analyzes the protected ground as such. The Court analyzes each protected ground in turn.

i. *Particular Social Group*

A “particular social group” must be (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic; (2) defined with particularity; and (3) socially distinct within the society in question. *See Matter of A-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. 316; 319 (AG 2018) (citing *Matter of M-E-V-G-*, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014)). “To be cognizable, a particular social group must ‘exist independently’ of the harm asserted in an application for asylum or statutory withholding of removal.” *Id.* (quoting *M-E-V-G-*, 26 I&N Dec. at 236 n.11, 243). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) stated that “[s]ocial groups based on innate characteristics such as sex or family relationship are generally easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social groups.” *Matter of C-A-*, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 959 (BIA 2006); *see Matter of Acosta*, 19

<sup>2</sup> Respondent proposed additional particular social groups related to her claim for past persecution including: (1) “direct descendants of \_\_\_\_\_”; (2) “female children of \_\_\_\_\_”; (3) “women and girls in Mexico;” and (4) “married women in Mexico.” Further, Respondent also proposed additional particular social groups for her claim of well-founded fear of persecution including: (5) “married women in Mexico who are unable to leave their relationship;” (6) “mothers of the children of \_\_\_\_\_;” and (7) “women in Mexico who are unable to leave their relationship with the father of their children.” However, the Court does not address their cognizability at this time.



I&N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).

First, common and immutable characteristics are those attributes that members of the group "either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences." *Acosta*, 19 I&N Dec. at 233 (listing sex, color, kinship, and shared past experiences as prototypical examples of an immutable characteristic). Respondent's social group, "Mexican females," satisfies the immutability requirement because it is defined by gender and nationality, two innate characteristics that are fundamental to an individual's identity. *Id.*; see also *Perdomo v. Holder*, 611 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2010) (reiterating that "women in a particular country, regardless of ethnicity or clan membership, could form a particular social group"); *Mohammed v. Gonzales*, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[G]irls or women of a particular clan or nationality (or even in some circumstances females in general) may constitute a social group . . .").

Second, to be cognizable, the proposed social groups must be sufficiently particular. *M-E-V-G-*, 26 I&N Dec. at 239 ("A particular social group must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group.") (citation omitted); see also *Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder*, 707 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The "particularity" requirement addresses the outer limits of the group's boundaries and requires a determination as to whether the group is sufficiently discrete without being "amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective;" "not every 'immutable characteristic' is sufficiently precise to define a particular social group." *A-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 335 (quoting *M-E-V-G-*, 26 I&N Dec. at 239). Here, the group is sufficiently particular because the membership is limited to a discrete section of Mexican society—female citizens of Mexico—and is thus distinguishable from the rest of society. See *Perdomo*, 611 F.3d at 667, 669 (rejecting the notion that a persecuted group could represent too large a portion of the population to constitute a particular social group); *M-E-V-G-*, 26 I&N Dec. at 239.

Finally, Respondent must demonstrate that the group is socially distinct within Mexico. To establish social distinction, an applicant must show that members of the social group are "set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the society in some significant way," *M-E-V-G-*, 26 I&N Dec. at 238, and that they are "perceived as a group by society." *Matter of W-G-R-*, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 216 (BIA 2014) (emphasis in original). The Board clarified that "a group's recognition for asylum purposes is determined by the perception of the society in question, rather than by the perception of the persecutor." *A-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 330 (quoting *M-E-V-G-*, 26 I&N Dec. at 242). Legislation passed to protect a specific group can be evidence that the society in question views members of the particular group as distinct. See *Henriquez-Rivas*, 707 F.3d at 1092. Yet, "a social group may not be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm." *A-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 331 (citing *M-E-V-G-*, 26 I&N Dec. at 238). "[S]ocial groups must be classes recognizable by society at large" rather than "a victim of a particular abuser in highly individualized circumstances." *Id.* at 336 (citing *W-G-R-*, 26 I&N Dec. at 217 (providing that "[t]o have the 'social distinction' necessary to establish a particular social group, there must be evidence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group"))).

The Court finds the evidence in the record demonstrates that Mexican society views members of the particular social group “Mexican females” to be distinct. *See id.* Notably, country conditions documentation in the record evinces that violence committed against Mexican females is “pandemic,” including femicide and domestic violence. Exh. 5 at 80, 255, 280. The 2017 United States Department of State Human Rights Report for Mexico (“2017 HR Report”) identified that federal law criminalizes femicide and rape, however, impunity for all crimes remained high. *Id.* at 42, 67. Indeed, Respondent’s home state of Morelos is tied for the highest number of rape and femicides. Exh. 7 at 73. Furthermore, in 2015 and 2016, the federal government began utilizing a “gender alert” mechanism to direct local authorities to “take immediate action to combat violence against women by granting victims legal, health, and psychological services and speeding investigations of unsolved cases.” Exh. 5 at 100. The government issued a “gender alert” for Morelos, and a federal agency worked to set in place measures for the security and prevention of violence for women. *Id.*; Exh. 7 at 83. The existence of these efforts demonstrates the government’s recognition of the need for specialized protection for Mexican females and, thus, that Mexican females are viewed as a distinct group from the general population in Mexico. *See* *Henriquéz-Rivas*, 707 F.3d at 1092; *Silvestre-Mendoza v. Sessions*, No. 15-71961, 2018 WL 3237505 (9th Cir. July 3, 2018) (unpublished) (the Ninth Circuit remanded to the BIA to consider whether “Guatemalan women” constituted a particular social group because the record appeared to support that it may be “socially distinct”).<sup>3</sup>

Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondent’s particular social group “Mexican females” is cognizable under the Act. Furthermore, the Court finds that Respondent is a member of the particular social group.

## ii. Particular Social Group Nexus

“Applicants must also show that their membership in the particular social group was a central reason for their persecution.” *A-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 319; INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i). A “central reason” is a “reason of primary importance to the persecutors, one that is essential to their decision to act. In other words, a motive is a ‘central reason’ if the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if such motive did not exist.” *Parussimova v. Mukasey*, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2008). The applicant may provide either direct or circumstantial evidence to establish that the persecutor was or would be motivated by the applicant’s actual or imputed status or belief. *See INS v. Elias-Zacarias*, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). Proof of motivation may consist of statements made by the persecutor to the victim. *See Sinha v. Holder*, 564 F.3d 1015, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2009) (providing that attackers’ abusive language showed they were motivated at least in part by a protected ground).

Here, Respondent provided sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to establish that her membership in the social group of “Mexican females” was at least one central reason for the persecution she suffered by her mother and her husband. Although Respondent’s mother is also a member of the particular social group “Mexican females,” a person may be persecuted by members of her own social group. As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[t]hat a person shares an identity with a persecutor does not . . . foreclose a claim of persecution on account of a protected ground.” *Maimi v. INS*, 212 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000). Respondent’s mother consistently

<sup>3</sup> Although unpublished decisions are not precedential, they serve as persuasive authority.



beat her, reasoning she was preparing Respondent for her life with her future husband. Exh. 5 at 5. She told Respondent that women needed to obey their husbands, and she beat Respondent because Respondent was female and needed to prepare to be a good wife. *Id.* at 4. Viewing the evidence of record in its totality, and, in particular, her mother's statements, the Court finds that Respondent's membership in her particular social group was at least "one central reason" for her persecution by her mother. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i); *Parussimova*, 555 F.3d at 741.

Similarly, Respondent testified that Mr. B frequently abused her because she was a Mexican woman. On one occasion, he awoke Respondent in the middle of the night, intentionally burned her with a cigarette, and demanded that she cook him food, dragging her by the hair to the kitchen and stating that "a woman's only job was to shut up and obey her husband." Exh. 5 at 5. During another occasion of abuse, Mr. B threw Respondent to the floor and said, "You're not going to step on me. I'm the man and you're going to do what I say." *Id.* The record supports that many individuals in Mexico have an endemic perception that women are inferior to men. *See generally id.* The record also includes the declaration of Nancy K. D. Lemon, an expert on domestic violence, in which she opined "gender is one of the main motivating factors, if not the primary factor, for domestic violence. In other words, the socially or culturally constructed and defined identities, roles, and responsibility that are assigned to women, as distinct from those assigned to men, are at the root of domestic violence." *Id.* at 118. In particular, Mr. B's statements in the context of Mexican society are strong evidence that if Respondent were not a woman, he would not have harmed her in this manner. Further, a report from Mexico's interior department, the National Women's Institute, and UN Women stated, "Violence against women and girls . . . is perpetrated, in most cases, to conserve and reproduce the submission and subordination of them derived from relationships of power." *Id.* at 253. As such, in the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Respondent's membership in the particular social group "Mexican females" was "at least one central reason" for her persecution by Mr. B. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i); *Parussimova*, 555 F.3d at 741.

### iii. Political Opinion

To establish that past persecution is on account of political opinion, an asylum applicant must meet two requirements. First, the applicant must demonstrate that she held, or that her persecutors believed she held, a political opinion. *Ahmed v. Keisler*, 504 F.3d 1183, 1192 (9th Cir. 2007). Second, the applicant must show that she was persecuted "because of" this actual or imputed political opinion. *Id.* The Ninth Circuit held that "[a] political opinion encompasses more than electoral politics or formal political ideology or action." *Id.* The factual circumstances of the case alone may at times be sufficient to demonstrate that the persecution was committed on account of a political opinion. *Navas*, 217 F.3d at 657.

Respondent asserts that Mr. B and her mother also persecuted her on account of her feminist political opinion. Respondent expressed her belief in the equality of men and women, including equality in opinions, worth, and support; she also believes that as a woman, she has the right to work. The Court finds Respondent's views constitute a political opinion. *See Ahmed*, 504 F.3d at 1192; *see also Fatim v. INS*, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating there is "little doubt that feminism qualifies as a political opinion within the meaning of the relevant statutes").

Next, the Court considers whether Respondent's political opinion was one central reason for the persecution she suffered by her mother and Mr. B. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i); *Navas*, 217 F.3d at 656. Respondent testified that her mother abused her to teach her that women needed to obey their husbands and that husbands were in charge. Respondent also testified that her mother admitted to physically abusing Respondent because she would "answer back." The record indicates that Respondent's mother was not primarily motivated to harm Respondent because of her political opinion. See *Parussimova*, 555 F.3d at 741. Therefore, the Court finds that Respondent's political opinion was not one central reason for the persecution she suffered by her mother. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i). However, the Court finds that Respondent's feminist political opinion was "a reason" for the persecution because Respondent's mother disagreed with Respondent's political opinion and abused Respondent, in part, for disagreeing with her. See INA § 241(b)(3)(A); see *Barajas-Romero v. Lynch*, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (nexus standard for withholding of removal is the protected ground must have been "a reason" for the persecution).

However, the evidence in the record demonstrates that Respondent's feminist political opinion was one central reason for the persecution by Mr. B. Respondent testified that Mr. B. burned her with a cigarette because she refused to quit her job and disobeyed his instruction to quit. Mr. B. also burned her face with a cigarette to show her that they were not equals, he was in charge, and to impress these principles upon her since he believed she did not understand them. She also testified that he beat her because she believed she had the right to her own opinions and ideas; specifically, Mr. B. beat her when she expressed her opinion that she had a right to work or she refused to cook for him. Based on Mr. B.'s actions and statements, the Court finds that Respondent's political opinion was at least one central reason for the persecution by Mr. B. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i); *Parussimova*, 555 F.3d at 741. Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. B. persecuted Respondent on account of her feminist political opinion. See *Ahmed*, 504 F.3d at 1192.

c. *Government Unable or Unwilling to Control Persecutor*

Finally, the applicant must demonstrate that the persecution she experienced was inflicted by the government or forces the government was unable or unwilling to control. *Navas*, 217 F.3d at 655-56. Prior unheeded requests for authorities' assistance or showing that a country's laws or customs deprive victims of meaningful recourse to protection may establish governmental inability or unwillingness to protect. See *Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions*, 850 F.3d 1051, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (providing that where "ample evidence demonstrates that reporting [persecution to police] would have been futile and dangerous," applicants are not required to report their persecutors"); *Afriyie v. Holder*, 613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that "the authorities' response (or lack thereof)" to reports of persecution provides "powerful evidence with respect to the government's willingness or ability to protect" the applicant and noting that authorities' willingness to take a report does not establish they can provide protection). Yet, applicants "must show not just that the crime has gone unpunished, but that the government is unwilling or unable to prevent it." *A-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 338. The Ninth Circuit also recognizes that there are significant barriers for children to report abuse. *Bringas-Rodriguez*, 850 F.3d at 1071.



Respondent testified that she did not report the abuse she suffered by her mother or Mr. B to the police because she believed it would be futile and that the police would not help her. *See id.* at 1073–74. Specifically, Respondent mentioned a friend who reported severe abuse by her husband to the police; however, the police merely told Respondent’s friend to “stop gossiping,” instructed Respondent’s friend to return to her house to do her “duties,” and blamed Respondent’s friend for the abuse because she was not doing her chores. *See Afritye*, 613 F.3d at 931.

The country conditions evidence in the record overwhelmingly establishes that any efforts by Respondent to report the abuse by Mr. B would have been futile. Although “[t]he fact that the local police have not acted on a particular report of an individual crime does not necessarily mean that the government is unwilling or unable to control crime,” here, the record supports Respondent’s testimony and indicates that the Mexican government is unable or unwilling to control Respondent’s persecutors. *A-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 337. The 2017 HR Report states that impunity for human rights abuses in Mexico remained a problem, “with extremely low rates of prosecution for all forms of crimes.” Exh. 5 at 42. Morelos, Respondent’s home state, has the fourth highest murder rate in the country and ranks in the top two for rape. Exh. 7 at 94. Relatedly, police and military were involved in serious human rights abuses and benefitted from the trend of impunity. Exh. 5 at 80, 88. A 2016 report found that nearly one in ten of Mexico’s police officers are unfit for service, and the country faces serious issues of police corruption on both the federal and local level with federal counter corruption efforts continually failing. *Id.* at 308, 312–17.

Furthermore, “Mexican laws do not adequately protect women and girls against domestic and sexual violence.” *Id.* at 269. Although federal laws address domestic violence, federal law does not criminalize spousal abuse, and the “[s]tate and municipal laws addressing domestic violence largely failed to meet the required federal standards and often were unenforced.” *Id.* at 67. Violence against women and domestic violence continue to be some of the most serious human rights abuses in Mexico, with approximately two-thirds of women in Mexico having experienced gender-based violence during their lives. *Id.* at 80, 198. Although the federal government has issued some “gender alerts” to focus efforts on assisting women victims of domestic violence, there has not yet been a noticeable impact. *Id.* at 101, 202. In addition, often, domestic violence victims did not report abuses due to fear of spousal reprisal, stigma, and societal beliefs that abuse did not merit a complaint. *Id.* at 100.

Additionally, in protective services, including police services, bias against women leads to inadequate investigations of abuse, resulting in impunity for abusers. *Id.* at 185–86, 202. In fact, investigations regarding femicide cases revealed that 70% of femicides were committed by intimate partners, and “the majority of [victims] had sought help from government authorities, but that nothing had been done because this type of violence was considered to be a private matter.” *Id.* at 187; *see also id.* at 297. Further, the Mexican government admitted its role in gender issues in the country, citing their “culture deeply rooted in stereotypes, based on the underlying assumption that women are inferior.” *Id.* at 187–88. There “has not been success in changing the cultural patterns that devalue women and consider them disposable.” *Id.* at 251.

Finally, despite efforts on the federal level to combat gendered violence, criminal investigations continue to be ineffective. *See id.* at 192. A common response from police is to not take a report of abuse seriously, similar to the response experienced by Respondent's friend. *Id.* Common responses by police include attempts to convince women not to file a complaint, or in the case where authorities do respond, they negotiate a "reconciliation" between the victim and the abuser. *Id.* Police treat domestic violence reporting as though it was the "normal state of affairs." *Id.* at 258 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, Mexican law enforcement authorities are not equipped to respond quickly or to effectively enforce protective orders. *Id.* at 193. The record indicates that "cases of violence against women are not properly investigated, adjudicated or sanctioned." *Id.* at 257.

In light of the evidence in the record, the Court finds that Respondent has shown that reporting the persecution to the authorities would have been futile or would have subjected her to further abuse. *See Bringas-Rodriguez*, 850 F.3d at 1073-74. Thus, the Court finds that Respondent met her burden to show that the government either condoned the actions of private actors or demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect victims like Respondent. *See A-B*, 27 I&N Dec. at 337.

Although the Attorney General stated in *A-B* that "[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence . . . perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum," the Attorney General did not foreclose this possibility, and the Court finds that in this particular case, Respondent established that she was persecuted on account of her membership in the particular social group "Mexican females" and her feminist political opinion by actors the Mexican government was unable or unwilling to control. *A-B*, 27 I&N Dec. at 320; *see* INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b).

## 2. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution

Because Respondent has demonstrated that she suffered past persecution in Mexico on account of a protected ground by actors that the government is unable or unwilling to control, she is entitled to a presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). DHS may overcome this presumption by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that Respondent no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in Mexico, or (2) Respondent could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the country. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i).

### a. Fundamental Change in Circumstances

The evidence indicates that Respondent no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution by her mother on account of her particular social group of "Mexican females." Respondent's mother abused her during the time she resided at home with her parents. Now, however, Respondent is no longer a child and does not live in her parents' home. Given these facts, Respondent's circumstances have fundamentally changed such that her mother does not remain a



danger to her, and the Court finds that Respondent no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution by her mother on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).

However, Mr. B has continued to contact and harass Respondent, including as recently as two years ago. Mr. B and Respondent's daughter, Ms. R, stated in her declaration that her father continues to ask about Respondent and is angry because Respondent was in a relationship with another man. Exh. 5 at 23. DHS did not present evidence to indicate a fundamental change in circumstances regarding Mr. B. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii). Therefore, the Court concludes that DHS failed to meet its burden to show that there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that Respondent no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution by Mr. B on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).

*b. Internal Relocation.*

In a case in which the applicant has demonstrated past persecution, DHS bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant's country of nationality and it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii); see also *A-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 344-45 (The Court "must consider, consistent with the regulations, whether internal relocation in [the applicant's] home country presents a reasonable alternative before granting asylum."). Generalized information about country conditions is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. *Molina-Estrada v. INS*, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002). Rather, DHS must introduce evidence that rebuts the applicant's specific grounds for fearing future persecution on an individualized basis. *Id.*

Here, Respondent testified that her entire family lives on the same piece of land as her parents' home. In addition, Respondent remains married to Mr. B. As recently as two years ago, Mr. B called Respondent seeking information regarding her location; he expressed that he wanted her to live with him again. She refused and changed her phone number. However, Mr. B continued to send her messages through Facebook asking about her whereabouts. Further, DHS has not introduced individualized evidence demonstrating that Respondent could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the country. See *Gonzales-Hernandez v. Ashcroft*, 336 F.3d 995, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the government must introduce evidence that, on an individualized basis, rebuts the applicant's specific grounds for fearing future persecution). Accordingly, the Court finds that DHS failed to meet its burden to show that Respondent could relocate within Mexico and thus, DHS failed to rebut Respondent's presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution by Mr. B both on account of her particular social group membership and her political opinion. *Id.*; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii). Therefore, the Court finds Respondent is statutorily eligible for asylum. See INA § 208(b)(1)(A).

*c. Independent Well-Founded Fear*

In the alternative, even in the absence of past persecution, an applicant may be eligible for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). An applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution if (1) she fears persecution in the country of

nationality on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, (2) there is a reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution if she were to return to that country; and (3) she is unable or unwilling to return to, or avail herself of the protection of that country because of such fear. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i). To demonstrate a well-founded fear, the applicant need not prove that persecution is more likely than not; even a ten-percent chance of persecution is sufficient to establish that persecution is a reasonable possibility. *Al-Harbi v. INS*, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987)).

i. Subjectively Genuine and Objectively Reasonable Fear

A well-founded fear of future persecution must be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. *Ahmed*, 504 F.3d at 1191. The subjective test is satisfied by credible testimony that the applicant genuinely fears persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground that is perpetrated by the government or by forces the government is unable or unwilling to control. *Rusak v. Holder*, 734 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2013). The objective component requires "credible, direct, and specific evidence" that the applicant risks persecution in her home country. *Id.*

In the instant case, Respondent credibly testified that she fears her ex-partner, Mr. H , will locate her and physically harm or kill her in Mexico. A respondent's credible testimony of fear of harm satisfies the subjective prong for a well-founded fear of persecution. See *id.* Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondent established that her fear is subjectively genuine. See *id.*

Next, the Court considers whether Respondent established through "credible, direct, and specific evidence" that her fear of returning to Mexico is objectively reasonable. See *id.* First, Respondent testified at length regarding the atrocious abuse she endured from 1998 until 2016 during her relationship with Mr. H in the United States. Over the course of their relationship, he consistently beat, raped, strangled, and psychologically abused her. Respondent testified that Mr. H raped her approximately five times per month and beat her approximately three times per month. The record also includes photographic evidence of the injuries Respondent sustained from the abuse by Mr. H . Exh. 5 at 29-38.

In addition, Ms. R stated in her declaration that Mr. H contacted her and her siblings seeking information regarding Respondent's location and stated that he was in Chiapas, Mexico. Exh. 5 at 24; see also Exh. 5 at 39 (text messages from Mr. H seeking Respondent's address in Mexico). Furthermore, the record reflects that Mr. H will have the ability, if he is not already present in Mexico, to enter Mexico and find and harm Respondent. Mr. H , as the father of three Mexican citizen children, could self-petition for permanent residency in Mexico, placing him in a position to have access to finding and harming Respondent. See Exh. 7 at Tab B-C. Additionally, Mr. H repeatedly beat and raped Respondent when she resisted reconciling with him or attempted to leave him in the past. Therefore, because Mr. H has expressed that he will attempt to find Respondent, it is likely that if Respondent again resists Mr. H she is at a high risk of harm by him. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Respondent's fear of future



harm by Mr. H is objectively reasonable, and she faces a chance greater than ten percent of persecution occurring upon her return to Mexico. *Al-Harbi*, 242 F.3d at 888.

iii. On Account of a Protected Ground

Respondent asserts that she will suffer persecution by Mr. H on account of her membership in the particular social group "Mexican females" and on account of her feminist political opinion. As discussed *supra*, the Court finds Respondent's proposed social group of "Mexican females" to be cognizable and that Respondent is a member of the group. In addition, the Court finds that Respondent holds a feminist political opinion, as discussed *supra*. Accordingly, the Court considers whether either protected ground would be one central reason for the persecution she would face in Mexico. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i).

The Court finds that Respondent's membership in the particular social group "Mexican females" would be at least "one central reason" for her future persecution. *Id.* Respondent has an objectively reasonable fear of persecution by Mr. H, particularly due to the abuse she suffered in the past. For example, on one occasion when Respondent rejected his sexual advances, Mr. H stated that Respondent was "his woman and had to have sex with him whenever he wanted," and thereafter raped Respondent. Exh. 5 at 8. On other occasions, Mr. H stated that Respondent needed to have sex with him whenever he wanted because she was a woman and thus, "his slave." *Id.* at 15. Mr. H also frequently bit Respondent, leaving marks on her neck and arms to show that she was "[his] woman" because others "need[ed] to know it." *Id.* at 9. These statements establish that Mr. H frequently harmed Respondent in the past because she was a woman, and the Court finds that her membership in her particular social group "Mexican females" would be at least one central reason for her future persecution. *See* INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i).

The Court also finds that Respondent's feminist political opinion would be one central reason for her future persecution, particularly because of her past experiences, which form the basis of her objectively reasonable fear of persecution. *Id.* Respondent testified that Mr. H frequently beat and raped her when she resisted his domination of her as the male head of the household. *See* Exh. 5 at 9-10. On one occasion, Mr. H beat Respondent so badly that she had a vaginal hemorrhage because she entered their home and told Mr. H that his friends should leave; he warned Respondent that she was not permitted to speak when entering the room. He also beat Respondent when she expressed her own opinions, justifying the abuse by stating that she was not allowed to have her own opinions or a say. Mr. H also exerted his dominance and control over Respondent by demanding she only work with other women and dress as he desired. If she resisted due to her belief that they were equal partners, Mr. H harmed her. Because Respondent's feminist opinion was a focus of Mr. H's abuse in the past, the Court finds that her feminist political opinion would be one central reason for her future persecution. *See* INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i).

Therefore, the Court finds Respondent would face future persecution on account of both her membership in the particular social group "Mexican females" and her feminist political opinion. *See id.*

iv. Government Unable or Unwilling to Control

Respondent must also establish that the persecution she would suffer will be inflicted by forces the government is unable or unwilling to control. *See Navas*, 217 F.3d at 655–56. The Court finds for the same reasons articulated in Section III.B.1.c. *supra*, the Mexican government would be unable or unwilling to control Mr. H. In addition, the Court notes that Respondent testified that if Mr. H. found her in Mexico and persecuted her, she would try to report it to the police, but she believed it would be futile. She believed the lack of police protection would result in impunity for Mr. H., giving him more power to abuse her in any manner he desired. Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondent met her burden to establish that the persecution she would suffer would be inflicted by actors the government is unable or unwilling to control. *See Navas*, 217 F.3d at 655–56.

v. Internal Relocation

If the applicant failed to demonstrate past persecution, to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, it is the applicant's burden to show that she could not avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the country and it would not be reasonable to expect her to do so. *See A-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 344–45; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii).

Here, Respondent established that she could not avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the country. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). Respondent testified that although she believed Mr. H. was removed to his native Guatemala, she believes he is presently in Mexico because his entire family resides in Mexico. Further, Ms. R. stated in her declaration that she spoke with Mr. H. and he stated in was in Chiapas and persists in seeking information regarding Respondent from her. Exh. 5 at 24.

In addition, Respondent stated that approximately one week after she was removed to Mexico, Mr. H. called her on her cell phone and told Respondent he was going to find her. During a second phone call, Mr. H. stated that he already confirmed that Respondent was residing at her parents' home in Mexico, and he would be "coming for [Respondent]." Despite Respondent's repeated pleas to Mr. H. to leave her alone, he continued to attempt to acquire information about Respondent's whereabouts through their children. Respondent fled to the United States after she continued to receive menacing phone calls from Mr. H. Respondent believes Mr. H. would be able to locate her anywhere in Mexico through their children or through their children's school documentation. *See also* Exh. 5 at 194–96 (abusers continue to have a right to obtain information about their children, making it relatively easy for an abuser to locate a woman fleeing his abuse). Indeed, their son stated in his declaration that Mr. H. contacted him seeking information regarding Respondent's location. *Id.* at 21. In addition, as previously noted, Respondent's entire family lives on the same piece of land as her parents' home. Further, country conditions evidence evinces that violence against women is a nationwide problem. *See generally* Exhs. 5, 9.

Because Respondent has established that she is likely to face danger throughout Mexico on account of her membership in a particular social group or political opinion, the Court finds



that she has met her burden of establishing that she cannot internally relocate to avoid persecution and it would not be reasonable for her to do so. Therefore, the Court finds that Respondent established that she has a well-founded fear of persecution and is statutorily eligible for asylum. See INA §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 208(b)(2)(B).

### 3. Discretion

"Asylum is a discretionary form of relief from removal, and an applicant bears the burden of proving not only statutory eligibility for asylum but that she also merits asylum as a matter of discretion." *A-B-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 345 n.12; see also INA § 240(c)(4)(A)(ii). This determination requires a weighing of both the positive and negative factors presented in Respondent's case. *Kalubi v. Ashcroft*, 364 F.3d 1134, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2004); *Matter of Pula*, 19 I&N Dec. 467, 473-74 (BIA 1987) (superseded in part by regulation on other grounds as stated in *Andriasian v. INS*, 180 F.3d 1033, 1043-44, n.17 (9th Cir. 1999)). To determine whether an asylum applicant merits relief in the exercise of the Court's discretion, the Court must consider the totality of the circumstances including the severity of the past persecution suffered and the likelihood of future persecution. *Gulla v. Gonzales*, 498 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2007); *Kalubi*, 364 F.3d at 1138. "[D]iscretionary factors should be carefully evaluated in light of the unusually harsh consequences which may befall an alien who has established a well-founded fear of persecution; the danger of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most egregious of adverse factors." *Pula*, 19 I&N Dec. at 474. Factors to consider include the applicant's age, health, and ties to the United States, among others. *Id.*

Here, Respondent has many positive equities. Respondent has lived in the United States for approximately 28 years. She is the primary wage earner for her family, has a consistent work history, and owns her own business. Respondent has three United States citizen children, two of whom live in the United States. She actively participates in her children's education. See Exh. 3. Furthermore, Respondent suffered severe past persecution and has a high likelihood of suffering severe persecution should she be removed to Mexico. Additionally, she continues to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder due to the abuse and harm she experienced throughout her life. See Exh. 9 at Tab C. She testified that should she be granted asylum, she would like to continue working on her business and raising her children.

These positive equities must be weighed against Respondent's negative equities; namely, her criminal history. In 2007, Respondent was convicted of criminal impersonation and was sentenced to one year of probation. Exh. 7 at 6-25. Respondent testified that when she attempted to renew her Arizona identification, she was instructed to include a social security number and she wrote down a random number. Respondent was also convicted of shoplifting and sentenced to pay a fine in 2007. *Id.* at 3-4. Finally, in 2017, Respondent was convicted for illegal entry and sentenced to 150 days of confinement. *Id.* at 27-29. While the Court does not condone Respondent's actions, her convictions are for relatively minor and nonviolent crimes. Respondent did not display an intent to defraud anyone, and Respondent's conviction for illegal entry was committed in the context of her attempt to flee Mexico.

Therefore, after carefully reviewing the entire record and weighing the equities in this case, the Court finds that Respondent warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, and the Court grants Respondent asylum in the exercise of discretion. *See A-B*, 27 I&N Dec. at 345 n.12.

### C. Alternative Finding: Withholding of Removal

Withholding of removal requires an applicant to establish that his life or freedom would be threatened in the country of removal because of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA § 241(b)(3)(A); *see Barajas-Romero*, 846 F.3d at 360 (explaining that the nexus requirement for withholding of removal includes weaker motives than the "one central reason" asylum standard). An applicant may prove eligibility for withholding of removal either (1) by establishing a presumption of future persecution based on past persecution that DHS does not rebut, or (2) through an independent showing of a clear probability of future persecution. *INS v. Stevic*, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(b)(1)-(2). The Supreme Court defined "clear probability of persecution" to mean that it is "more likely than not" the applicant would be subject to persecution on account of a protected ground if returned to the proposed country of removal. *Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. at 429.

For the same reasons elucidated above, considering the entire record, the Court also finds Respondent is statutorily eligible for withholding of removal because it is more likely than not that her life or freedom would be threatened in the future in Mexico because of a protected ground. *See* INA § 241(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). Accordingly, the Court grants Respondent withholding of removal in the alternative.

### D. Alternative Finding: Protection Under the Convention Against Torture

Protection under the CAT is mandatory relief if the requirements are met. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). The applicant bears the burden of establishing that it is more likely than not she would be tortured by or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity if removed to Mexico. *Id.*; *Zheng v. Ashcroft*, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003). Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for purposes such as intimidation, coercion, punishment, or discrimination, by, at the instigation of; or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity, including willful blindness. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit held that the applicant need only show "awareness" and "willful blindness" on the part of government officials. *Zheng*, 332 F.3d at 1197. Under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, "[i]t is enough that public officials could have inferred the alleged torture was taking place, remained willfully blind to it, or simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it." *Ornelas-Chavez v. González*, 458 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006).

The Court must consider all evidence relevant to the likelihood of future torture, including, but not limited to: past torture inflicted upon the applicant; evidence that she could relocate to another part of Mexico where it is unlikely she will be tortured; gross, flagrant, or mass violations of human rights; and other relevant information regarding conditions in Mexico.



See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).

Respondent believes Mr. B. or Mr. H. will rape or kill her if she returns to Mexico. The evidence in the record corroborates Respondent's fear of torture. First, Respondent credibly testified that she experienced torture in the past by both men. See *Edu v. Holder*, 624 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting *Nuru v. Gonzales*, 404 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (the existence of past torture "is ordinarily the principal factor on which [the court must] rely")). Mr. B. beat her numerous times, and he burned her with a cigarette on two occasions. In addition, Mr. H. repeatedly raped and beat Respondent. The Court is satisfied that both Mr. B. and Mr. H. intentionally inflicted severe pain and suffering upon Respondent that rises to the level of torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

Moreover, Respondent continues to suffer the effects of the torture today. See *Mohammed v. Gonzales*, 400 F.3d 785, 802 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that evidence of past torture that causes "permanent and continuing harm" may be sufficient to establish eligibility for CAT relief). Respondent suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder due to the abuse and harm she experienced throughout her life. See Exh. 9 at Tab C. She continues to think about the abuse she experienced every day and suffers from frequent nightmares of her former partners trying to kill her. *Id.*

Additionally, Mexican females continue to have limited, if any, means to escape violence, particularly in family relationships. Exh. 5 at 181. Mexico continues to display "deep and persistent insensitivity to gender issues," causing widespread gender-based violence throughout society, as well as in domestic relationships. *Id.* The Court previously found that Respondent could not relocate to avoid harm from either Mr. B. or Mr. H. If women attempt to move elsewhere in the country, they are unprotected and there are no guarantees for their safety. *Id.* Based on the combination of all of the above factors, the Court finds that Respondent would not be able to safely relocate in Mexico, contributing to the likelihood that she would more likely than not be tortured if returned to Mexico.

Respondent has also demonstrated that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of the Mexican government. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The country-conditions documentation indicates that the Mexican government has made attempts to curb violence against women; for example, it has enacted the gender alert systems intended to protect women. See Exh. 5 at 202. However, the record indicates that the government's actions have had no effect on the current situation in Mexico and laws protecting women are not enforced effectively. *Id.* The Mexican legal system is unresponsive and ineffective, and as discussed above, justice officials are unwilling or unable to protect women from gender-related harms in their homes and elsewhere, despite recent efforts to improve this problem. *Id.* at 181. This is reflected in the few prosecutions or convictions for femicides. *Id.* at 202.

Not only is the Mexican government ineffective in protecting women from sexual violence and torture, but the record contains evidence that the government is aware of and "willfully blind" to such treatment. The Mexican government admitted the country's difficult adjustment from its mentality that women are inferior. *Id.* at 187-88. As previously noted, police often do not seriously consider reports of abuse and commonly negotiate a reconciliation

with abusers, placing the woman reporting the abuse at risk of future harm; police treat domestic violence, including incidents of torture by a partner, as the "normal state of affairs." *See id.* at 192, 258. This culture of violence against women, combined with high levels of impunity for gender-based violence, sufficiently demonstrate a pattern of acquiescence by government officials to the type of violence women like Respondent face. *See id.* at 251, 253.

Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Respondent has established that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured with the acquiescence of the Mexican government upon her return. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). Accordingly, the Court grants Respondent protection under CAT in the alternative.


#### IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Respondent suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of her membership in a particular social group and her political opinion. The Court also finds that the Mexican government is unable or unwilling to protect Respondent and that she cannot internally relocate within Mexico. Thus, she is statutorily eligible for asylum, and the Court grants her application in the exercise of its discretion. Finally, the Court finds that Respondent is statutorily eligible for withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3) and protection under CAT, and the Court would grant Respondent's applications for such relief in the alternative.

In light of the foregoing, the following order<sup>4</sup> shall enter:

#### ORDER

**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Respondent's application for asylum under INA § 208(a) be and hereby is **GRANTED**.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Miriam Hayward  
Immigration Judge

<sup>4</sup> Pursuant to 8 CFR § 1003.47(i), a copy of the post order instructions and information on the orientation on benefits available to asylees is attached to this decision and hereby served on the parties.